UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

1-5-2016

State v. Powell Appellant's Brief Dckt. 43107

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Powell Appellant's Brief Dckt. 43107" (2016). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 5986.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/5986

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendan t-Ap pellan t.

BRIEF

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL
DISTRICT COURT OF
FIRST JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF' THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

FRED
District

State Appellate
State of Idaho
I.S.B. #5867

MAYAP. WALDRON
Deputy State Appellate
I.S.B. #9582
P.O. Box 2816
Boise, ID 83701

GIBLER

Division
83720
Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
Defender

(208) 334-2712

ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

FIL
JAN O5 2016

... 11

....................................................................... 1

STATEMENT OF THE
Nature of the

......................................................................................... 1

Statement of the Facts and
Course of Proceedings.......

.. ............................................................................... 1

ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL

.5

ARGUl\1ENT ....................................................................................................................... 6
The District Court Ened When It Denied Mr. Powell's Motion To
Suppress Because The Statements Used Against Hirn Were
Taken In Violation Of His Fifth Amendment Right
Against Self-Incrimination ............................................................................................. 6
A.

B.

Fifth Amendment Applies To All Proceedings-Including
Parole Proceedings-In Which The Government
Incriminating Testimony .................................................................................. .
Mr. Powell
A
His Fifth

Pmvell's Fifth

D. The Court Of Appeals Incorrectly Decided Van Konzen
Thus That Case Does
Dictate
Outcome Here.

.. ........................ 12

1. The
Komen Court's Holding
On Its
................................................................... 12
Misunderstanding Of
2. The Van Komen Court Overlooked The Crux Of The
Holding In lvfurphy .................................................................................... 19
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................. 20
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ......... ..

14
317F.3dl(lst
of Gault, 387

13

.. 7

I (1

Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S.

(l 978)..............................................................

Co. v. InterNorth Inc., 634 F.2d 690 (2d
Estrada v. State, I

14

1980) ................................ 16

Idaho 558 (2006) .............................................................................. 7

v. United

424 U.S. 648 (1976) .................................................................... 7

v. Califhrnia, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) ....................................................................... 17

IO, 1L 18

Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977) ................................. .
Lefkowitz v.

414

........ 6,7,13,21

70 (1973) ......................... ..
188 (1977) ................ .

V.

V.

McGautha v.
v. Lile,

1

402 U.S. 1

13

.1

9

(1971) ................................................................. 14

U.S. 24 (2002) ..................................................... .

A4innesota v. A1urphy, 465 U.S. 420 ( 1984) ................................................................. 7, 19
Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. VVoodard, 523 U.S. 272 ( I 998) .........................

......... 14

Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552 (1980) ................................................................. 11
Sandin v.

, 515 U.S. 472 (1995)...

............................................................ 1

Searcy v. Simmons, 299 F.3d 1220 (l 0th Cir. 2002) .......................

18

............................. 13

Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967) ............................................................................. 17
State v. Holland, 135 Idaho 159 (2000) .............................................................................. 6

11

.6

1

395

11

11

Stephen M. Rice, Conventional Logic:

the Logical Fallacy

669

as a

m

7,

2005) ...

16

the
.................... 16

m

one

then charged him

two sons. The

with two counts of le\vd conduct. After losing his motion to suppress the statements he made at
parole-related proceedings and

district court

pied guilty to one count

denying
were

to

Po\vell's motion to suppress his statements and

in violation

incrimination. During the parole

a classic penalty situation. He either
pnson, a penalty which amounted to

to

was charged

incriminated himself,

vacate

courL

Powell's son,

to

's step-father

molested him. (Defendant's Exhibit 1 to 7/16/15 Rule
p.3.) During

convicted as a

reverse

J

to suppress, and

In June 2006,

his Fifth Amendment right against self-

Mr. Powell

or risk
He

lewd

Hearing2

Mr. Powell had
("Def.

l "),

course

sons, S.A. and J.A. J.A. told the police that he remembered taking a shower with Mr. Powell

1 The record sometimes refers to Mr. Powell's three sons by the last names "Powell" and
"Arnold." It appears their last name is currently Arnold.
2 Mr. Powell attached Defendant's Exhibit 1 to the motion to augment the record, which he filed
along with this brief.

1,

not

The court
In 2013,

with seven
was being considered

Powell had nearly finished serving his fixed time

parole. As

of

parole process, he met

. (R.,

13 for a

officer Dianna Carnell in

parole

Mr. Powell

At

disclosed another incident involving Z.A., and admitted that he had molested his two other boys,
and S.A.

(Id.)

recommended that

Ms.

and

Po\vell be paroled. (Id)

Mr. Powell went
sons,

reported Mr. Powell's disclosure to

front of

a friend, were all

July
(R., pp.60-64.)

as

13.
Powell made

same admissions to

)
15. (R., p.63.)

In

General's office

Mr. Po\vell
filed

Mr.

of lewd conduct for

his

(R., pp.65-81.)

in this case-one count of

State
and one count

(R., pp.27-28.)

Mr. Powell filed a motion to suppress all of the evidence obtained while he was
incarcerated and participating in the parole process, including what he said during the pre-parole

It appears that on page 10 of Defendant's Exhibit 1, the reporting officer accidentally refers to
S.A. as J.A.

3

2

and were thus

of
10/8/14

- p.29,

I 0.)

(R.,

on the other hand,

that

Mr. Powell had no right against self-incrimination during the parole process, he never
right, and he

the

from the Idaho Attorney General's Office freely

voluntarily. (R., pp.101-06; see also 10/8/14 Tr., p.23,

18

p.24, L.20.)

district court denied Mr. Pm.vell's motion:
The situation here came about
[Mr. Powell] elected to proceed
with the request for parole. Part of the parole process, as was explained by
Ms. Carnell, was that they're asked certain questions that they're expected to
answer. And that has to do with a lot of things. It's not-not related to charging
them with crimes. That's someone else's jurisdiction. But it has to do with
contacting victims and making sure that someone is
to be able to make it
once they're on parole. So pmi of the parole process is to ask about other
at least in a sex offender situation.
thing
because the issue is
statements
\Vere voluntary [sic]. First,
was not promised that there would
no
prosecutions if
proceeded to answer the questions, required to go through the
parole
Certainly he had hope, but Ms. Carnell has made it clear that
was no promises [sic]-no promises were given him. The issue becomes
somewhat confused in that
defense
raised the issue as to whether the-by
making the statements that would be used against him, it appears that the parole
board does not use these statements against him since they elected to proceed and
recommend parole. It's Kootenai County who's bringing the new charges based
upon, at least in part I guess, upon statements that have been made.
So the issue was whether his statements were voluntary. And there was
one case
I
Yersus Warden, ... where the court
an
issue similar to this in front of it and stated: "The voluntary statement or
interview, however, even when given the hope of improving the inmate's chances
for parole, is not compelled and therefore is not protected by the Fifth
Amendment." Certainly I could see where there would be cases where perhaps it
could be a different statement. But here there was nothing compelled againstnothing to compel the defendant other than his desire to be released prior to the
expiration of his unified term. And that does not render his statements

3

statements

to

to one count
136-38; 10/24/14 Tr.) Both in the
of plea
to challenge

court
; 10/24/14

district court's denial of his motion to dismiss. (R.,
Mr.

never filed a

4

to

he could have challenged on appeal, and the denial that Mr. Powell
was the

order

to

his motion to

is properly before this
with two
5

4

5

fixed, to run concurrent

Powell

Defense
did
a
on a
to "''"''H"''"'·
Powell is scheduled to be paroled in this case at the
4

1,

16.

5

a

are

State v. Page, 1

constitutional principles to the

(2004)

1,

135 Idaho 159, 161 (2000)).

V.

that no "'""""n "shall be compelled

The Fifth
to

Idaho

Supreme Court

himself."

a

against

held the Fifth

compelled answers

use of a

subsequent

case

any

I 87, 193 (2000)

v. Radford, I

trial.
78 (1973)).

statements

to

himself or
statements he

of that

This Court should vacate Mr. Powell's judgment
denying his

to

and

to

district court.

The Fifth Amendment "not only permits a person to refuse to testify against himself at a
criminal trial in vvhich

is a defendant,

also 'privileges him not to answer official

put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers

6

m

V.

not turn upon
nature of

of proceeding

statement or

which its

is invoked, but

which it invites."' (quoting

and the

Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49 (1967))). Thus, "[a] defendant does not lose this protection

reason of

conviction of a crime .... "

countervailing government interests,

465 U.S. at

a general rule,

as criminal rehabilitation, do not trump this right."

United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th

2005); see also id. at 1134-35 ("when

'questions put to [a) probationer, however relevant to his probationary

call for answers

that would incriminate him in a pending or later criminal prosecution,' he may properly invoke
his right to remain silent") (quoting },;furphy, 465 U.S. at 435). Therefore, the privilege applies
regardless of the type of proceeding or the government interests at issue, so long as the
sought

B.

a risk of

Because Mr. Powell Faced A "Classic Penaltv Situation." He Did Not Waive His Fifth
Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination
A defendant does not necessarily waive the privilege by failing to invoke it.

The

U.S. Supreme Court in 1vfurphy explained that a witness "ordinarily must assert the privilege
rather than ans,.ver if he desires not to incriminate himself," AifwJJhy, 465
general rule is "inapplicable in cases where

assertion

at 429, but that the
so as to

'foreclos( eJ a free choice to remain silent, and ... compe[l] ... incriminating testimony,"' id. at
434 (quoting Garner v. United States,

U.S. 648, 661 (1976) (omissions and alterations in

ongmal)). lviurphy went on to explain:

7

however
probationary
incriminate him in a pending or later criminal prosecution.
a substantial basis in our cases for concluding that if the state,

There is
either
or
implication, asserts that invocation of the privilege would
lead to revocation ol probation. it v,muld have created the classic penalty
situation, the failure to assert the privilege would be excused, and the
compelled and inadmissible in a
probationer's annvers would be
at

(emphasis added and footnote omitted).

Court found,

that Murphy's

condition did not create a classic

situation because his "probation condition

only

statements; it said

his freedom to decline to answer particular

and certainly contained no

probation was conditional on his

his Fifth Amendment privilege with
Here, on

other

to further criminal prosecution.

Mr. Powell

Id at 4 3 7.

penalty
not

Mr.
and

himself.

a

as

IS

the threat of losing the ability to parole out amounted to a penalty even though this case
involved losing a

at parole rather than having probation or parole

infra,

pp.10-11.)

Mr. Powell's Fifth Amendment Rights Were Violated Because His Statements Led To
His Incrimination And, Had He Not Incriminated Himself. He Would Not Have Been
Paroled
The Fifth Amendment provides that no
to be a

np·~"'"""

against himself." The U.S.

"shall be compelled in any criminal case
Court has

8

to

articulate what

to

court

a

that:

(I) the testimony sought by

government carried the

of

refusing to testify amounted to compulsion.

and (2) the penalty faced

Antelope, 395 F.3d at 1134; see also A1cKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 49 (2002) (J. O'Connor,
concurring 6) ("The text of the Fifth Amendment does not prohibit all penalties levied in response
to a person's refusal to incriminate himself or herself-it prohibits only the compulsion of such

Fifth Amendment, we hare asked whether the

testimony. . . . [A]s suggested by the text of
imposed in such situations rises

lo

a level

it is likely to 'compe[l} · a person 'to

be a witness against himse(l "') (emphasis added).
The first prong requires that the \Vitness face "'a real and appreciable danger of selfincrimination.

Antelope, 395 F.3d at 11

1983)). "This is not to

(quoting li1cCoy v. Comm 'r, 969 F.2d 1234, 1236

... that the prosecutorial sword must actually strike or be

poised to strike," but the threat cannot be "remote, unlikely, or speculative." Id. at 11

Here,

the risk of incrimination could not be more real and appreciable. Mr. Powell was charged with
two additional felonies because of the statements he made during the parole process, he pied
guilty to one charge after he lost his motion to suppress those statements, and he was sentenced
to serve two to twenty years in prison.
The second prong asks "whether the government has sought to 'impose substantial
penalties because a witness elects to exercise his Fifth Amendment right not to give

Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion was the narrowest and thus controls. See Antelope,
395 F.3d at 1133 n.1.

6

9

11

answer 1s

has

liberty as a result of invoking his Fifth Amendment right.

Id. at 1139.

main difference between the penalties in Antelope and
additional burden
as Justice

case 1s

Antelope

incarceration, while Mr. Powell faced losing the benefit of parole.
plurality opinion in A1cKune

a difference.

A1cKune addressed an inmate's claim that
which required that he admit to all past

sex-offender treatment
or else lose his "privilege status"

536 U.S. at
went

1. When

inmate refused to participate,
as

a

opportunities, canteen

his

access to a

television. Id. at 31. Although

plurality, along with Justice O'Connor concurring, went on to hold that

loss of privileges in

A1cKune were not severe enough to compel a person to incriminate himself, id. at 36, 48-49,
Justice Kennedy took the

to explain that

benefit versus burden comparison is

The prison ,varden in this case stated that it is largely a matter of chance where in
a prison an inmate is assigned. Even if Inmates A and B are serving the same
sentence for the same crime, Inmate A could end up in a medium-security unit
and Inmate B in a maximum-security unit based solely on administrative factors
beyond their control. Under respondent's view, ho\vever, the Constitution allows
the State to offer Inmate B the opportunity to live in the medium-security unit
conditioned on his participation in the SA TP, but does not allow the State to offer
Inmate A the opportunity to
in that same medium-security
subject to the

10

is extending a benefit or taking away a privilege rests entirely in

of

beholder. For this reason, emphasis of any baseline, while superficially appealing, ·would be an
inartfid addition to an already conji1sed area (~/jurisprudence." Id. (emphasis added); see

id ('"We doubt that a principled distinction may be drawn bet\veen "enhancing" the punishment
"leniency" he claims would be appropriate if

imposed upon the petitioner and denying him
he had cooperated.

(quoting Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 557 n.4 (1980)).

According to the plurality's reasoning, it makes no difference that Mr. Powell would lose
only the ability to be placed on parole as opposed to having his parole revoked. Nor is it
dispositive that Mr. Powell had only the opportunity for parole. See Cunningham, 431 U.S. at
807

the coercion . . . we must
likely (ij attainrnent. Prudent
in making decisions; to

into account potential
weigh heavily such legally unenfhrceable

removal of those prospects constitutes economic

coercion.") This is all the more true because Mr. Powell was actually granted parole. (R., p.63.)
The penalty here (not being paroled)

practically speaking, no different than

penalty

Antelope (having probation revoked). Because Mr. Powell faced a penalty which amounted to
compulsion and his statements actually incriminated him, the use of his statements in this case
violated his Fifth Amendment right

court

those statements and their fruits. See Radford, 134 Idaho at 193 (quoting Turley, 414 U.S. at 78).

11

7

to

by relinquishing jurisdiction

district court violated his right against
to participate in a polygraph

over

Court of

[B]ased on the kfcKune holding that
can be no compulsion
the
consequences of invoking the right
self-incrimination do not implicate a
defendant's liberty interests, and the Coassolo holding that defendants in the
retained jurisdiction program do not have a liberty interest in probation, we
conclude that the district court's demands did not amount to compulsion in regard
to the Fifth Amendment analysis. Van
did not have a liberty interest in
probation, so relinquishing jurisdiction could not implicate his liberty interests.
Because relinquishing jurisdiction could not implicate Van Komen's liberty
interests, relinquishing jurisdiction also could not amount to compulsion. While
Van Komen's choice between refusing the polygraph and receiving his underlying
the Constitution by
sentence vvas no doubt a difficult one, the court did not
requiring him to choose. Thus, the district court did not violate Van Komen's
Fifth Amendment rights or abuse its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction.
2015 WL 7785342, at *4. The Van

Court's holding

on

misreading

two U.S. Supreme Court cases, was wrongly decided, and should not govern here.

1.

The Van Ko men Court's Holding Turned On Its Misunderstanding Of 1vfcKune

The Van Komen Court mistakenly found the holding in McKune to be that "there can

7

After Van Kamen came out, Mr. Powell moved to suspend the briefing in this case because Van
Komen decided an issue similar to the one here and Van Komen was not yet final. The State
objected, explaining that "[i]t is unclear how the Court of Appeals' narrow holding in Van
Komen that the district court did not violate Van Komen's rights by considering his refusal to
take a polygraph examination in deciding to relinquish jurisdiction has any bearing on whether
Powell's statements at his parole hearing should have been suppressed." (Objection to "Motion
to Suspend the Briefing Schedule" and Statement in Support Thereof, p.3.) This
Mr. Pmvell's motion, and Mr. Van Komen has since filed a petition for review.
12

O'Connor concurring. Van Konzen attempted to find the common ground between the
plurality and Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion, explaining:
Although the plurality and Justice O'Connor disagreed on what standard
applies to define a liberty interest, they agreed that there can be no compulsion
where the consequences of invoking the right do not implicate a defendant's postsentencing libe1iy interests. In her conctmence, Justice O'Connor stated that
longer incarceration
a penalty for refusing to incriminate oneself would surely
implicate a 'liberty interest"' and constitute compulsion.
Van Kamen, 2015 WL 7785342, at *3 (quoting

536 U.S. at 52).

As an initial matter, the Van Komen court's attempt to craft a holding out of both the
plurality and concurring opinions in AfcKune was itself improper. See Van Komen, 2015 WL
7785342, at

The

Supreme Court

holding is "'that position taken by
narrowest grounds.

instructed that.

Members who concurred in

Antelope, 395 F.3d at 11

193 (1977)).
opinion was

n.1

judgments on the

v. United

430 U.S.

the First, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have agreed, Justice O'Connor's
narrowest

id.; Ainsivorth v. Stanley, 3 I 7 F.3d

1, 4 (1st Cir. 2002); Searcy v. Sirnmons, 299 F
concurred only in the result,
holding in },lcKune, as

plurality opinions, the Court's

1225 (10th Cir. 2002). Justice O'Connor

explicitly rejected

by Justice

plurality's reasoning. Therefore, the
herself, is

in

conditions in that case were not a penalty sufficient enough to amount to compulsion. See
McKune, 536 U.S. at

("I find the plurality's failure to set forth a comprehensive theory of

the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination troubling. But because this case
indisputably involves burdens rather than

I

13

not

penalties

not state that a liberty

,nt,~,·pct

fare

to

m

on

was a prerequisite to compulsion. 8 In concluding as
read it to mean something

plucked

than what it actually says, and ignored the remainder of Justice O'Connor's reasoning to
that both Justice O'Connor and the plurality

a liberty interest is a prerequisite to

finding compulsion.
The paragraph on which the Van Komen Court relied states in full:
Although I do not think the penalties respondent faced were sufficiently
serious to compel his testimony, I do not agree with the suggestion in the plurality
opinion that these penalties could permissibly rise to the level of those in cases
like AtfcGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971) (holding that statements made
in the mitigation phase of a capital sentencing hearing may be used as evidence of
guilt), Bordenkircher r. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) (holding that plea bargaining
does not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination), and
Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272 (1998) (holding that there
is no right to
at a
at 2028-2030. The

Further, it is not entirely clear that the plurality found a liberty interest to be a prerequisite to
compulsion. First, the plurality did not adopt the process test from Sandin v. Conner, 515
472 (1995), but explained:
The determination under Sandin ·whether a prisoner's liberty interest has been
curtailed may not provide a precise parallel for determining ,vhether there is
compelled self-incrimination, but it does provide useful instruction for answering
the latter inquiry. Sandin and its counterparts underscore the axiom that a
convicted felon's life in prison differs from that of an ordinary citizen. In the
prisoners, those same
context of a legitimate rehabilitation program
considerations are relevant to our analysis. The compulsion inquily must consider
the significant restraints already inherent in prison life and the State's own vital
interests in rehabilitation goals and procedures within the prison system.
McKune, 536 U.S. at 37 (emphasis added). Second, the plurality explicitly rejected the notion
that extending benefits would be permissible while imposing burdens would not. Id. at 46
("[W]hether the government is extending a benefit or taking away a privilege rests entirely in the
eye of the beholder. For this reason, emphasis of any baseline, while superficially appealing,
would be an inartful addition to an already confused area of jurisprudence.").
8

14

(J. O'Connor, concurring) (emphasis added and citations reformatted).

536 U.S. at

Court took one part of one sentence (indeed, the only sentence in

First, the

Justice O'Connor's opinion that contained the term "liberty interest") out of context to support
its reasoning. See Van Komen, 2015 WL 7785342, at *3.

In the above paragraph, Justice

O'Connor explained that she disagreed with the plurality's implication that certain penalties
addressed in earlier U.S. Supreme Court cases~-including longer incarceration and executionvvould not be sufficiently compelling to violate the Fifth Amendment. A1cKune, 536 U.S. at 52.
She explained that the stakes in those cases \vere greater than the stakes the Court had already
held to be impermissible in the penalty

which included the loss of one's job,

professional license, or government contract.
as longer

and

id at 49-50. She then said that penalties such

would

statement did not, as the Van Komen

id at 52.

rationale that led

concluded, adopt the

O'Connor to write a concurring opinion in the first place.
7785342, at *3.

"

implicate a liberty

Van Ko men, 2015 WL

Instead, that statement appears to have been aimed at undercutting the

plurality's reliance on Sandin, given that the plurality found that penalties which clearly
implicated liberty interests would be permissible. See 1\lfcKune, 536 U.S. at
Second,

Van

Court

that sentence to mean something

than

it

actually says. See Van Kamen, 2015 WL 7785342, at *3. The Court correctly stated that Justice
O'Connor found longer incarceration would be an impermissible penalty (though apparently the
plurality disagreed), and that longer incarceration implicates a liberty interest. See 1\1cKune,

15

at

outcomes
oneself would surely implicate a liberty interest

(J. O'Connor,

But Justice O'Connor did not-even once-link those two propositions or
otherwise say or imply that a liberty interest was a prerequisite for compulsion.9
In concluding otherwise, the Van Kornen Court not only misread those two

but

relied on a logical fallacy known as "denying the antecedent." See generally Stephen M.
Rice, Conventional Logic: Using the Logical Fallacy of Denying the Antecedent as a Litigation

Tool,

Miss. LJ. 669 (2010). "The proposition that 'A implies B' is not the equivalent of

implies non-B,' and neither proposition follows logically from the other.

Crouse-Hinds

Co. v. lnterNorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 702 n.20 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Agri Processor Co. v.
NLRB, 514 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2008). In other \Vords, just

is sufficient to compel

(B), does not mean that penalties that do not

liberty interests (non-A) are insufficient to compel testimony (non-B).
Third, the Van Komen Court overlooked the bulk of Justice O'Connor's opinion when
construing the kfcKune holding. See Van Komen, 2015 WL 7785342, at *3. As the whole of her
opinion makes clear, Justice O'Connor focused not on the presence of a liberty interest, but on

For this same reason, the Court of Appeals mistakenly contended that Van Komen's reliance on
Antelope was misplaced. Van Komen, 2015 WL 7785342, at *4 n.3. Antelope had the benefit of
Justice O'Connor specifically stating that, in her view, longer incarceration would amount to an
impermissible penalty. The Antelope plurality did not, however, read Justice O'Connor's
concurring opinion in McKune to mean that only penalties implicating a liberty interest could
amount to compulsion. See Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128.
9

16

to

was

text
not
resoo11se to a person's refusal to incriminate himself or herself-it prohibits only
the compulsion of such testimony. Not all
necessarily "compel[s]"
incriminating statements.
[A]s suggested by the text of the Fifth
1,fe have asked
the
pressure imposed in such situations rises to a level 1vvhere it is likely to
"compe[l]" a person "to be a witness against himself"
The same analysis applies to penalties imposed upon a person as a result
of the failure to incriminate himself-some penalties are so
as to
"compe[l}" such testimony, while others do not rise to that level.
536 U.S. at 49 (J. O'Connor, concurring) (emphasis added). Had Justice O'Connor
thought that only penalties involving liberty interests could be sufficiently compelling, she would
said so.
Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court's early penalty cases, on which both lvfurphy and
at stake. Afarphy,

relied, did not require that a liberty
536

at

5·
'

U.S. at

nature

on

of the Fifth Amendment is compulsion,

("[T]he

and imprisonment are not

penalties capable

forcing

self-incrimination which the Amendment forbids.") (emphasis added); Spevack v. Klein, 385
511, 515-16 (1967) (Penalty "means, as we said in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609,614
(1965)
'costly.'

imposition of any sanction which makes assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege
threat of disbarment

the

of

reputation, and of livelihood are powerful forms of compulsion to make a lmvyer relinquish the
privilege.") (plurality opinion) ( citations reformatted). Therefore, the Court rejected
that a property interest was necessary for a valid Fifth Amendment claim:
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claim

we must
economic benefits realistically likely <~f attainment. Prudent persons ·weigh
heavily such legally unenforceable prm,pects in making decisions; to that
removal of those prospects constitutes economic coercion.

Finally, Justice O'Connor specifically criticized the plurality's reliance on the due
m

the

515

V.

which state prison regulations created a liberty interest:
I find the plurality's failure to set forth a comprehensive theory of the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination troubling. But because this
case indisputably involves burdens
than benefits, and because I do not
believe the penalties assessed against respondent in response to his failure to
incriminate himself are compulsive on
I
not resolve this
dilemma to make my judgment in this case.
Although I
not
is
same as
the
process
we ident{jied in S'andin, I join in the judgment reached
the plurality's opinion.
U.S. at
(''l

with

compulsion
hardship'

claims

id. at

see

is broader than

\Ve have adopted for evaluating

prisons ....
Justice O'Connor was concerned only with \Vhether the penaity imposed was
so,

this is

itself precludes. Not once did she qualify that standard with any prerequisite that
the penalty involve a liberty interest.

The Van Komen Court's conclusion that both Justice

O'Connor and the plurality agreed that "there can be no compulsion where the consequences of
invoking

not

1S
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15

at

Supreme Court's decision in Murphy,

Van Komen Court relied in
court h:=is hekl

was no

a

the court would revoke his probation absent truthful statements to his probation officer." Van
15 WL 7785342, at

465

statement is not

at 434-39).

accurate. As the 1vfurphy Court made clear, Murphy's fear was W?finmded and therefore
not have compelled him to speak. The Court said: ·'On its
proscribed only false

Murphy's probation

nothing about his freedom to decline to answer

it

questions and certainly contained no

his probation was conditional on

at alL

Court

to

probation based on a probationer's invocation of his right to
to a

silent

likely amount

penalty situation:
our cases for concluding that if
either
There is ... a substantial basis
expressly or by implication, asserts that invocation of the privilege v,:ould lead to
revocation of probation, it would have created the classic penalty situation, the
to assert the privilege would be excused,
the probationer's answers
would
compelled
inadmissible in a
465 U.S. at 435 (emphasis added

footnote omitted); see also

Contrary to Van Komen's reasoning, Murphy supports Mr. Powell's claim in this case.

19

pp.7-8.

having the opportunity to
himself.

sufficient to compel

Powell to

incriminating statements were ultimately used against him,

in his conviction and incarceration in this case. Because Mr. Powell's statements were taken
of his Fifth Amendment rights, the district court

denying his motion to

requests that this Court vacate his

and reverse the district

denying his motion to
this

5th

day of

2016.

Deputy State Appellate Public
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